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Abstract—Recent advances in interference exploitation showed
that exploiting knowledge of interference constructively can
improve the receive signal-to-interference and noise ratio (SINR)
at the destination. This paper exploits this concept to design
artificial noise (AN) beamformers constructive to the intended
receiver (IR) yet keeping AN disruptive to possible eavesdroppers
(Eves). A multiple-input single-output (MISO) wiretap channel
with multiple eavesdroppers scenario has been investigated taking
both perfect and imperfect channel information into considera-
tion. The main objective is to improve the receive SINR at the
IR through exploitation of AN power in an attempt to minimize
the total transmit power, while confusing the Eves.
I. INTRODUCTION
While dealing with the catastrophe of interference, tra-
ditional goal is to suppress or even kill the interference
power in order to improve system performance [1]. However,
recent developments in interference exploitation techniques
have revolutionised this traditional way of managing known
interferences [2]. Constrictive interference (CI) precoding ap-
proaches suggest that interference power can even contribute
to the received signal power if properly exploited [2]–[4]. In
particular, downlink beamforming design can be significantly
improved by symbol-level precoding of known interferences
[5].
Recently, physical-layer security (PLS) approaches have
attracted a great deal of attention in the information-theoretic
society since the accompanying techniques can afford an
extra security layer on top of the traditional cryptographic
approaches [6]–[9]. To make physical-layer secrecy viable,
we usually need the legitimate user’s channel condition to
be better than the eavesdroppers’. However, this may not
always be guaranteed in practice. To alleviate the dependence
on the channel conditions, recent studies showed that the
spatial degrees of freedom (DoF) provided by multi-antenna
technology can be exploited to degrade the reception of
the eavesdroppers [6], [7]. A more operational approach is
to send artificially generated noise signals to interfere the
eavesdroppers deliberately [6]–[8]. Depending on the extent
of eavesdroppers CSI available at the transmitter, different
strategies can be applied to generate the optimal AN beams.
If no eavesdroppers’ CSI is available, then a popular design
is the isotropic AN [6], where the message is transmitted in
the direction of the intended receiver’s channel, and spatio-
temporal AN is uniformly spread on the orthogonal subspace
of the legitimate channel. On the other hand, with knowledge
of the eavesdroppers’ CSI to some extent, one can block
the eavesdroppers’ interception more efficiently by generating
spatially selective AN [7], [8]. More recently, an antenna array
based directional modulation scheme (DM) has been studied
which enhances security through adjusting the amplitude and
phase of the transmit signal along a specific direction by
varying the length of the reflector antennas for each symbol
while scrambling the symbols in other directions [10], [11].
In this paper, we exploit the knowledge of interference
available at the transmitter for improving security in wireless
systems. In this context, we redesign AN signals in the
form of constructive interference to the intended receiver (IR)
while keeping AN disruptive to potential eavesdroppers (Eves).
We consider a multiple-input single-output (MISO) downlink
system in the presence of multiple Eves. We aim at minimizing
the total transmit power while boosting the received SINR at
the IR as well as degrading the Eves’ SINR in an attempt to
keep the same below certain threshold. The benefits of con-
structive interference-based AN precoding scheme is twofold
compared to conventional AN-based physical-layer security
schemes considered in [6]–[8]. Firstly, the constructive AN
will boost the receive SINR at the IR as opposed to the
conventional AN-based schemes which attempt to suppress
AN signals along the direction of the IR. Secondly, to achieve
a predefined level of SINR at the IR, constructive interference
based precoding scheme requires lower power compared to
conventional AN precoding, thus diminishing inter-user as
well as inter-cell interferences. Both perfect and imperfect CSI
cases have been investigated. Numerical simulations demon-
strate that the proposed constructive AN precoding approach
yields superior performance over conventional schemes in
terms of transmit power.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a MISO downlink system where the transmitter
(BS) equipped with NT transmit antennas intend to transmit
a secret message to the IR in the presence of K possible
eavesdroppers. The IR and the Eves are all equipped with
a single antenna. In order to confuse the Eves, the BS injects
AN signals into the secret message in an attempt to reduce the
receive SINRs at the Eves. Thus the received signal at the IR
and those at the Eves are given, respectively, by yd and ye,k:
yd = h
T
d x+ nd, (1)
ye,k = h
T
e,kx+ ne,k, for k = 1, . . . ,K, (2)
where hd and he,k are the complex channel vectors between
the BS and the IR and between the BS and the kth Eve, respec-
tively, nd ∼ CN (0, σ2d) and ne,k ∼ CN (0, σ2e ) are the additive
Gaussian noises at the IR and the kth Eve, respectively. The
BS chooses x as the sum of information beamforming vector
bdsd and the AN vector bn ,
∑N
i=1 bn,isn,i such that the
baseband transmit signal vector is
x = bdsd +
N∑
i=1
bn,isn,i, (3)
where sd ∼ CN (0, 1) is the confidential information-bearing
symbol for the IR and sn,i ∼ CN (0, 1), ∀i, are the AN
symbols in which N denotes the number of AN symbols.
Accordingly, the received SINR at the IR is given by
γd =
∣∣hTdbd∣∣2∑N
i=1
∣∣hTdbn,i∣∣2 + σ2d , (4)
and that at the kth Eve is given by
γe,k =
∣∣∣hTe,kbd∣∣∣2∑N
i=1
∣∣∣hTe,kbn,i∣∣∣2 + σ2e
, ∀k. (5)
The transmit signal x can also be expressed as
x = bdsd +
N∑
i=1
bn,ie
j(φn,i−φd)sd, (6)
where sd = dejφd . Assuming constant envelop d = 1, the
instantaneous transmit power is given by
PT =
∥∥∥∥∥bd +
N∑
i=1
bn,ie
j(φn,i−φd)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
. (7)
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a power minimization problem for secure trans-
mission of information to the IR while maintaining the QoS of
signal reception. In order to satisfy the secrecy requirements,
conventional power minimization problem is formulated as
P0 : min
bd,{bn,i}
‖bd‖2 +
N∑
i=1
‖bn,i‖2 (8a)
s.t.
∣∣hTdbd∣∣2∑N
i=1
∣∣hTdbn,i∣∣2 + σ2d ≥ Γd, (8b)∣∣∣hTe,kbd∣∣∣2∑N
i=1
∣∣∣hTe,kbn,i∣∣∣2 + σ2e
≤ Γe,k, ∀k. (8c)
The power minimization problem has been solved considering
various system configurations [7], [8]. Although the solutions
proposed in [7], [8] are optimal from stochastic viewpoint, the
hidden power in the AN signals has been treated as harmful
for the desired information, and hence, either nullified or
suppressed. In the following section, we endeavour to develop
precoding schemes exploiting the AN power constructively for
the desired signal at the IR.
Fig. 1: Constructive AN design for the legitimate receiver.
IV. CONSTRUCTIVE AN-BASED SECURE PRECODING
In this section, we take the above approach one step forward,
by actively exploiting interference (AN in this case) construc-
tively for the IR to reduce the required power for a given SNR
threshold, while guaranteeing the secrecy constraint for the
Eves. The theory and characterization criteria for constructive
interference have been extensively studied in [2]–[4]. The AN
signal will be constructive to the received signal at the IR
if that moves the receives symbols away from the decision
thresholds of the constellation (e.g., real and imaginary axes
for QPSK symbols in Fig. 1). Hence we intend to keep the
angle of that part aligned with the angle of the corresponding
desired symbol sd by appropriately designing the transmit
beamforming vectors. We can do so by pushing the decision
symbols towards the constructive regions of the modulation
constellation, denoted by the green shaded areas (cf. Fig. 1).
Exploiting this concept, it can be shown that the receive
SINR (4) at the IR can be rewritten as [4]
γd =
∣∣∣hTdbdsd + hTd ∑Ni=1 bn,isn,i∣∣∣2
σ2d
. (9)
However, the SINR at the kth Eve remains the same as in (5)
since no AN signal has been made constructive to the Eves.
Thus exploiting AN power constructively, the SINR con-
straint (8b) can be reformulated as the following system of
constraints
∠
(
h
T
dbdsd +
N∑
i=1
h
T
dbn,isn,i
)
= ∠ (sd) (10a)
ℜ
{
h
T
d
(
bd +
∑N
i=1 bn,ie
j(φn,i−φd)
)}2
σ2d
≥ Γd, (10b)
where ℜ{x} indicates the real part of the complex number x
and ∠x denotes the corresponding angle. Note that the phases
of the AN signals in (10b) has been shifted by the phase of
the desired symbol sd.
Let us denote y˜d , hTd
(
bd +
∑N
i=1 bn,ie
j(φn,i−φd)
)
as
the received signal ignoring the AWGN at the IR, with
constructive AN injected, and αR and αI as the abscissa
and the ordinate of the phase-adjusted signal y˜d, respectively.
Applying basic geometric principles, it can be observed from
Fig. 1 that the AN contaminated received signal y˜d does not
necessarily need to strictly align the angle of the desired signal.
That is, y˜d lays on the constructive zone of the desired symbol
sd as long as the following condition is satisfied
−θ ≤ φd ≤ θ, i.e., |αI|
αR − Γ˜d
≤ tan θ, (11)
where Γ˜d , σd
√
Γd and θ = pi/M , M is the constellation
size. Thus the strict angle constraint (10a) can be relaxed as
[12]∣∣∣∣∣ℑ
{
h
T
d
(
bd +
N∑
i=1
bn,ie
j(φn,i−φd)
)}∣∣∣∣∣
≤
(
ℜ
{
h
T
d
(
bd +
N∑
i=1
bn,ie
j(φn,i−φd)
)}
− σd
√
Γd
)
× tan θ, (12)
where ℑ{x} indicates the imaginary part of the complex
number x. Thus the constructive interference based secure
transmit precoding optimization problem is formulated as
P1 : min
bd,{bn,i}
∥∥∥∥∥bd +
N∑
i=1
bn,ie
j(φn,i−φd)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
(13a)
s.t.
∣∣∣∣∣ℑ
{
h
T
d
(
bd +
N∑
i=1
bn,ie
j(φn,i−φd)
)}∣∣∣∣∣
≤
(
ℜ
{
h
T
d
(
bd +
N∑
i=1
bn,ie
j(φn,i−φd)
)}
−σd
√
Γd
)
tan θ, (13b)∣∣∣hTe,kbd∣∣∣2∑N
i=1
∣∣∣hTe,kbn,i∣∣∣2 + σ2e
≤ Γe,k, ∀k. (13c)
The problem (13) can be reformulated as a standard SOCP,
which can be optimally solved using optimization toolboxes,
e.g., CVX [13].
V. ROBUST CONSTRUCTIVE INTERFERENCE PRECODING
In the previous sections, it was assumed that perfect CSI
of all the nodes is available at the transmitter. However,
that is a very strict assumption for many practical wireless
communication systems. In particular, obtaining the perfect
Eves’ CSI is always a challenging task. Hence in this section,
we study robust AN precoding design for scenarios when the
available CSI is imperfect.
We model the imperfect CSI considering the widely used
Gaussian channel error model such that the channel error
vectors have circularly symmetric complex Gaussian (CSCG)
distribution. Thus, the actual channels between the BS and the
IR can be modeled as
hd = hˆd + ed, (14)
and that between the BS and the kth Eve can be modelled as
he,k = hˆe,k + ee,k, ∀k, (15)
where hˆd and hˆe,k, ∀k, denote the imperfect estimated CSI
available at the BS and ed, ee,k ∈ CNT×1, ∀k, represent the
channel uncertainties such that ‖ed‖2 ≤ ε2d, and ‖ee,k‖2 ≤
ε2e , ∀k, respectively.
A. Conventional AN-Aided Robust Secure Precoding
Conventional AN-aided downlink robust secrecy power
minimization problem with SINR constraints is formulated as
min
bd,{bn,i}
‖bd‖2 +
N∑
i=1
‖bn,i‖2 (16a)
s.t. min
‖ed‖≤εd
∣∣hTd bd∣∣2∑N
i=1
∣∣hTdbn,i∣∣2 + σ2d ≥ Γd, (16b)
max
‖ee,k‖≤εe
∣∣∣hTe,kbd∣∣∣2∑N
i=1
∣∣∣hTe,kbn,i∣∣∣2 + σ2e
≤ Γe,k.(16c)
Due to the spherical channel uncertainty model, constraints
(16b) and (16c) actually involve infinitely many constraints
which makes the problem (16) very difficult to solve. However,
applying S-procedure [8, Lemma 2], the inequality constraints
in (16) can be transformed into convex linear matrix inequality
constraints and thus problem (16) can be readily solved using
existing solvers.
B. Constructive AN-Aided Robust Secure Precoding
With the deterministic channel uncertainty model described
above, we consider worst-case based robust design. Thus the
constructive AN based robust power minimization problem can
be formulated as
min
bd,{b¯n,i}
∥∥∥∥∥bd +
N∑
i=1
b¯n,i
∥∥∥∥∥
2
(17a)
s.t.
∣∣∣∣∣ℑ
{
h
T
d
(
bd +
N∑
i=1
b¯n,i
)}∣∣∣∣∣
≤
(
ℜ
{
h
T
d
(
bd +
N∑
i=1
b¯n,i
)}
− σd
√
Γd
)
tan θ,
∀‖ed‖ ≤ εd, (17b)∣∣∣hTe,kbd∣∣∣2∑N
i=1
∣∣∣hTe,kb¯n,i∣∣∣2 + σ2e
≤ Γe,k, ∀‖ee,k‖ ≤ εe, ∀k,
(17c)
where b¯n,i , bn,iej(φn,i−φd). Considering the real and imag-
inary parts of each complex vector separately, we have
hd = hˆR,d + jhˆI,d + eR,d + jeI,d, (18)
bd = bdR + jbdI , (19)
bn,i = bnR,i + jbnI,i, ∀i, (20)
where the subscripts R and I indicate the real and imaginary
components of the corresponding complex notation, respec-
tively. As such, we have the real part,
ℜ
{
h
T
d
(
bd +
N∑
i=1
b¯n,i
)}
= h˜Td bd,1 +
N∑
i=1
h˜
T
d b˜n1,i
+e˜Td bd,1 +
N∑
i=1
e˜
T
d b˜n1,i, (21)
where h˜d ,
[
hˆ
T
R,d hˆ
T
I,d
]T
, e˜d ,
[
e
T
R,d e
T
I,d
]T
, bd,1 ,[
b
T
R − bTI
]T
, and b˜n1,i ,
[
b
T
nR,i − bTnI,i
]T
, ∀i. On the
other hand, the imaginary component can be expressed as
ℑ
{
h
T
d
(
bd +
N∑
i=1
b¯n,i
)}
= h˜Td bd,2 +
N∑
i=1
h˜
T
d b˜n2,i
+e˜Td bd,2 +
N∑
i=1
e˜
T
d b˜n2,i, (22)
with bd,2 ,
[
b
T
I b
T
R
]T
, and b˜n2,i ,
[
b
T
nI,i b
T
nR,i
]T
, ∀i.
Thus the constraint (17b) can be explicitly expressed as the
following two constraints
max
‖ed‖≤εd
h˜
T
dbd,2 +
N∑
i=1
h˜
T
d b˜n2,i + e˜
T
dbd,2 +
N∑
i=1
e˜
T
d b˜n2,i
−
(
h˜
T
d bd,1 +
N∑
i=1
h˜
T
d b˜n1,i + e˜
T
dbd,1 +
N∑
i=1
e˜
T
d b˜n1,i
)
tan θ
+ σd
√
Γd tan θ ≤ 0 (23)
max
‖ed‖≤εd
−
(
h˜
T
dbd,2 +
N∑
i=1
h˜
T
d b˜n2,i + e˜
T
dbd,2 +
N∑
i=1
e˜
T
d b˜n2,i
)
−
(
h˜
T
d bd,1 +
N∑
i=1
h˜
T
d b˜n1,i + e˜
T
dbd,1 +
N∑
i=1
e˜
T
d b˜n1,i
)
tan θ
+ σd
√
Γd tan θ ≤ 0. (24)
Now, the constraint (17c) can be rewritten as
max
‖ee,k‖≤εe
∥∥∥[h˜Te,kB¯n, σe]∥∥∥ ≥ 1√
Γe,k
h˜
T
e,kbd,1, ∀k, (25)
where h˜e,k ,
[
h
T
eR,k h
T
eI,k
]T
and Bn is defined as B¯n ,[ ℜ{Bn} ℑ {Bn}
ℑ {Bn} ℜ {Bn}
]
with Bn , [bn,1, · · · ,bn,N ]. Apply-
ing S-procedure [14], the SOC constraint (25) can be rewritten
as an equivalent linear matrix inequality (LMI)
fk
(
B¯n, h˜e,k
)
,[
βkh˜e,kbd,1 [h˜e,kB¯n, σe]
[h˜e,kB¯n, σe]
T
(βkh˜e,kbd,1)I(2N+1)
]
≥ 0, ∀k, (26)
where βk , 1√
Γe,k
. By substituting he,k = hˆe,k + ee,k in the
LMI above, we obtain
f¯k
(
B¯n, h˜e,k
)
, fk
(
B¯n ,˜ˆhe,k
)
+ΨkΛk + Λ
T
kΨ
T
k , (27)
where Ψk , I2N+2 ⊗ e˜e,k and Λk ,[
1
2βkbd,1 [B¯n, 0]
0
(
1
2βk
)
I(2N+1) ⊗ bd,1
]
. Note that the
uncertainty matrix Ψk belongs to a subspace of block
diagonal matrices with equal blocks. Hence, the spectral
norm of Ψk is ‖Ψk‖ = ‖e˜e,k‖ ≤ εe.
Now, (27) holds if and only if there exists a µk such that[
fk
(
B¯n ,˜ˆhe,k
)
− µkI(2N+1) ΛTk
Λk µkε
−2
e Iq
]
 0, ∀k, (28)
where q = 4NT(N + 1). By replacing the CSI error bounds
in the constraints (23) and (24), the robust problem (17) can
thus be reformulated as
min
b1,b2
‖b2‖2 s.t. (29a)
h˜
T
dbd,2 +
N∑
i=1
h˜
T
d b˜n2,i −
(
h˜
T
dbd,1 +
N∑
i=1
h˜
T
d b˜n1,i
)
tan θ
+ εd
∥∥∥∥∥bd,2 +
N∑
i=1
b˜n2,i −
(
bd,1 +
N∑
i=1
b˜n1,i
)
tan θ
∥∥∥∥∥
+ σd
√
Γd tan θ ≤ 0, (29b)
−
(
h˜
T
dbd,2 +
N∑
i=1
h˜
T
d b˜n2,i + (h˜
T
d bd,1 +
N∑
i=1
h˜
T
d b˜n1,i) tan θ
)
− εd
∥∥∥∥∥bd,2 +
N∑
i=1
b˜n2,i + (bd,1 +
N∑
i=1
b˜n1,i) tan θ
∥∥∥∥∥
+ σd
√
Γd tan θ ≤ 0, (29c)[
fk
(
B¯n ,˜ˆhe,k
)
− µkI(2N+1) ΛTk
Λk µkε
−2
e Iq
]
 0, ∀k.
The problem (29) can be efficiently solved using existing
solvers [13].
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
This section presents numerical simulation results to evalu-
ate the performance of the proposed constructive interference
based PLS algorithms in a MISO wiretap channel. For sim-
plicity, it was assumed that Γe,k = Γe, ∀k and σ2d = σ2e = 1.
Unless otherwise specified, N = 3 and QPSK is the modula-
tion scheme considered. All the estimated channel vectors are
generated as independent and identically distributed complex
Gaussian random variables with mean zero and the TGn
path-loss model for urban cellular environment is adopted
considering a path-loss exponent of 2.7. All simulation results
are averaged over 1000 independent channel realizations,
unless explicitly mentioned. In the following simulations, we
compare the performance of the proposed approaches with that
of the conventional AN-aided precoding scheme in [7] as the
benchmark. Specifically, we denote the conventional precoding
schemes as ‘Conv Prec’ and the constructive interference based
precoding scheme developed in Sections IV and V-B as ‘Const
Prec’ in the figures below.
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Fig. 2: Transmit power PT versus re-
quired SINR at IR Γd with NT = 8,K =
4, 6, and Γe = 5 (dB).
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Fig. 4: Transmit power PT versus re-
quired SINR Γd with NT = 6,K = 3,
Γe = 5 (dB), and εd = 0.1, εe = 0.3.
We start the performance analysis of the proposed precoding
schemes assuming perfect CSI. Fig. 2 shows the average
transmit power versus the SINR requirement at the IR required
for the proposed constructive AN precoding optimization
scheme (in problem (13)) as compared with the conventional
AN precoding scheme (in problem (8)) for K = 4 and 6,
NT = 8 and Γe = 5 (dB). It can be observed that the proposed
constructive interference algorithms achieve significant power
gains compared to the conventional AN precoding scheme.
In the next example, we examine the transmit power require-
ment against the maximum allowable eavesdropping SINR Γe.
Fig. 3 plots the average transmit power PT versus Γe for
NT = 6, K = 4 and different values of Γd. The results in
Fig. 3 are consistent with those in Fig. 2 in the sense that
increased SINR threshold at the IR requires higher transmit
power. However, with the increase in the allowable SINR
threshold at the Eves, the required transmit power gradually
decreases due to the relaxed eavesdropping constraints. Also,
in any case, the constructive interference based precoding
schemes outperform the conventional AN-aided secure pre-
coding schemes.
Finally, we analyze the performance of the proposed robust
beamforming design with NT = 6,K = 3, Γe = 5 (dB),
and εd = 0.1, εe = 0.3, when imperfect CSI is available at
the BS. In Fig. 4, the robust schemes indicate the solution
to the problems (16) and (29), respectively, for conventional
and constructive AN based precoding schemes. On the other
hand, the ‘Non-robust’ scheme is designed treating the im-
perfect channel estimates available at the BS as the perfect
CSI, hence yields noticeable performance degradation. The
proposed constructive interference based robust secure beam-
forming schemes demonstrate significant transmit power gain.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We proposed the novel idea of designing the AN-aided
secure precoding schemes as constructive to the IR and
destructive to the Eves at the same time. The concept opens
up new opportunities for expanding the secrecy rate regions.
We studied the downlink transmit power minimization prob-
lem considering both perfect and imperfect CSI at the BS.
Simulation results demonstrated that significant performance
gain is achievable by the proposed constructive AN precoding
schemes compared to the conventional schemes and have
established the proposed approach as a new dimension in the
design of PLS.
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